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Introduction 
In 2002, an intellectually disabled man, Daryl Renard Atkins, sat on 
death row after a capital murder conviction.1 Mr. Atkins was diagnosed 
as “mildly mentally retarded” after a forensic psychologist reviewed his 
school and court records and interviewed people who knew him.2 As 
further proof of intellectual disability, Mr. Atkins scored fifty-nine on an 
IQ test.3 After reviewing Mr. Atkins’ records, the US Supreme Court 
made a precedent-changing decision4 in which it held that the execution 
of intellectually disabled persons5 is unconstitutional as a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s6 restriction on “cruel and unusual punishments.”7  
 The Atkins Court held that the nation’s “evolving standards of 
decency” precluded states from taking the life of an intellectually 
disabled offender.8 The Supreme Court cited, in part, two reasons for its 
decision: (1) retribution, the justification typically accepted as a basis for 
the death penalty, may not apply to intellectually disabled offenders;9  
1. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002). 
2. Id. at 308. 
3. Id. at 309. 
4. The Atkins Court overruled Penry v. Lynaugh, which held that executing 
intellectually disabled persons is constitutional and not a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment. 492 US. 302, 340 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
5.  Although the Atkins Court used the term “mentally retarded,” “the 
currently preferred term for the disability historically referred to as mental 
retardation is “intellectual disability,” and I will refer to the disorder in 
this Note by its currently recognized name. Robert L. Schalock et al., The 
Renaming of Mental Retardation: Understanding the Change to the Term 
Intellectual Disability, 45 Intell. & Developmental Disabilities 116, 
120 (2007). 
6.  U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 
7. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320. 
8. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 
(1958)).  
9. Id. at 319. 
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013  
Defining Intellectual Disability and Establishing a Standard of Proof 
319 
and (2) intellectually disabled defendants are “less able to give 
meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor witnesses, 
and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of 
remorse for their crimes.”10 Because intellectually disabled defendants are 
not capable of controlling their impulses or engaging in logical reasoning, 
they are unable to understand the reason for their punishment.11 Thus, 
executing these individuals “is nothing more than the purposeless and 
needless imposition of pain and suffering, and hence an unconstitutional 
punishment.”12 
The Court left to the states the task of developing appropriate ways 
to enforce this constitutional restriction.13 However, the Court provided 
guidelines to the states by quoting intellectual disability definitions 
promulgated by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in its 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (DSM-IV) and the American 
Association of Mental Retardation (now known as the American 
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD)).14 
Though the definitions of intellectual disability endorsed by the APA 
and the AAIDD are similar, they are not identical. This difference 
created confusion among the states concerning which definition to follow. 
Ultimately, some states applied the APA’s definition while others 
applied the definition from the AAIDD. Additionally, the two definitions 
only address what constitutes intellectual disability and not the legal 
requirements for proving the disorder. Thus, the Court left states no 
guidance on the procedural aspects of adjudicating these types of cases. 
Consequently, the states have varying definitions of intellectual 
disability and diverse procedures for proving a defendant’s mental 
capacity. This variation creates disparity amongst the states whereby a 
defendant executed in one state could have been considered intellectually 
disabled and thus ineligible for execution in another.  
It is unknown whether the Court failed to foresee the problems that 
would arise in applying Atkins or purposefully neglected to address 
them. After ten years of nationwide confusion regarding application of 
the Atkins decision, states have created multiple standards for what 
evidence is necessary to prove intellectual disability, the standard of 
 
10. Id. at 320-21. 
11. Id. at 318. 
12. Id. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).  
13. Id. at 317.  
14. See id. at 309. The American Association of Mental Retardation changed 
its name to the AAIDD in 2007, and I will refer to this organization with 
its current name. World’s Oldest Organization on Intellectual Disability 
Has a Progressive New Name, American Association on 
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), 
http://www.aaidd.org/content_1314.cfm (last visited Feb. 16, 2013); see 
also Schalock et al., supra note 5, at 120. 
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proof necessary, what type of qualifications are needed to testify as an 
expert, and whether the determination of a defendant’s mental capacity 
should be made by a judge or jury.15 The Atkins Court set out to protect 
all individuals with intellectual disabilities,16 but some states have 
enacted statutes or upheld case law that is inadequate to protect 
intellectually disabled persons. Thus, the time has come for states to 
adopt a new test for the purpose of proving intellectual disability and 
protecting all intellectually disabled individuals. 
In this Note, I suggest a new model definition and standard of proof 
that all states should apply for determining intellectual disability. In 
doing so, I analyze the varying standards currently in force in several 
states and identify those that fail to adequately protect the intellectually 
disabled and those that best promote the underlying goal of Atkins. In 
demonstrating why a new standard for defining and establishing a 
defendant’s intellectual disability is needed, I use cases from various 
jurisdictions to show how a defendant’s outcome would be different in 
one state compared to another with different standards. Part I discusses 
the varying definitions of intellectual disability and the symptoms and 
characteristics associated with the disorder. It also considers the 
proposed changes the APA and the AAIDD are making to their 
definitions of intellectual disability and the impact of these changes. 
Part II describes several states’ varying standards for defining and 
establishing intellectual disability. Part II also analyzes statutes and 
cases that apply various Intelligence Quotient (IQ) cutoff scores, 
differing standards for demonstrating adaptive functioning, and 
fluctuations regarding the age-of-onset requirement, including 
evidentiary differences. Part III examines the procedural and burden of 
proof variations between the states. This includes differences in whether 
a judge or a jury makes the determination of a defendant’s mental 
capacity, the varying qualifications for testifying experts, and the 
divergent standards for the burden of proof. Part IV explains the urgent 
need for change in several states’ current intellectual disability laws. 
Part V proposes a new optimal standard for defining intellectual 
disability, including evidentiary and procedural standards that all states 
should adopt. 
 
15. State Statutes Prohibiting the Death Penalty for People with Mental 
Retardation, Death Penalty Information Center, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-statutes-prohibiting-death-penalty-
people-mental-retardation (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).  
16. The Court emphasized that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man . . . . The Amendment 
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 (quoting 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)). 
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I. Defining Intellectual Disability 
A. Professional Organizations’ Diverging Definitions 
Since 1876, the AAIDD has been one of the leading organizations 
dedicated to helping individuals with mental disabilities in the United 
States.17 Its mission is to “promote progressive policies, sound research, 
effective practices, and universal human rights for people with 
intellectual and developmental disabilities.”18 The AAIDD publishes two 
journals, the American Journal on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities and Intellectual and Development Disabilities.19 For these 
reasons, the AAIDD was one of the primary resources for the Supreme 
Court in Atkins and remains a principal guide for many state courts and 
legislatures attempting to understand and define intellectual disability 
today.20  
Another association recognized for its contributions to mental health 
is the APA. Established in 1844,21 the APA is the “world’s largest 
psychiatric organization . . . [representing] more than 36,000 psychiatric 
physicians from the United States and around the world.”22 Part of the 
organization’s mission is to “work together to ensure humane care and 
effective treatment for all persons with mental disorders, including 
intellectual developmental disorders and substance use disorders.”23 The 
APA publishes one of the most widely utilized manuals on mental 
disorders, known as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM).24 The 
DSM describes and classifies mental disorders and is used by “health and 
mental health professionals, including psychiatrists and other physicians, 
psychologists, social workers, nurses, occupational and rehabilitation 
therapists, and counselors.”25 
 
17. About Us, AAIDD, http://www.aaidd.org/content_2383.cfm?navID=2 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013).  
18. Mission, AAIDD, http://www.aaidd.org/content_443.cfm?navID=129 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
19. Journals, AAIDD, http://www.aaidd.org/content_577.cfm?navID=154 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
20. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002).  
21. About APA, American Psychiatric Association (APA), 
http://www.psychiatry.org/about-apa--psychiatry (last visited Feb. 16, 
2013). 
22. Id.  
23. Id.  
24. DSM, APA, http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm (last visited Feb. 
15, 2013). 
25. Id.  
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The Atkins Court quoted the definition of intellectual disability the 
AAIDD set forth in 1992.26 Ten years later, the AAIDD revised that 
definition,27 though there were no significant changes to the substantive 
characteristics of the disorder.28 The AAIDD further updated its 
definition of intellectual disability in 2010 by changing the terminology 
from “mental retardation” to “intellectual disability.”29 The 2010 
definition is the most current and is substantively the same as the 2002 
definition.30 Today, the AAIDD states that “[i]ntellectual disability is . . 
. characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning 
and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical 
adaptive skills . . . [and this] disability originates before the age of 18.”31 
The AAIDD explained that “the term intellectual disability covers the 
same population of individuals who were diagnosed previously with 
mental retardation in number, kind, level, type and duration.”32 The 
change in terminology from mental retardation to intellectual disability 
 
26. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3. In 1992, the AAIDD defined intellectual 
disability as “substantial limitations in present functioning . . . 
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing 
concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following 
applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living social 
skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional 
academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18.” 
American Association on Mental Retardation, Mental 
Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of 
Supports 5 (9th ed. 1992). 
27. FAQ on Intellectual Disability, AAIDD, http://www.aaidd.org/ 
content_104.cfm?navID=22 (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). The AAIDD’s 
2002 definition was “[m]ental retardation is a disability characterized by 
significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive 
behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills[,] . 
. . [and this] disability originates before age 18.” American Association 
on Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition, 
Classification, and Systems of Supports 1 (10th ed. 2002).  
28. Despite various changes to the definitions of intellectual disability “an 
analysis of the definitions used over the last 50+ years shows that the 
three essential elements of intellectual disability/mental retardation . . . 
have not changed substantially.” Schalock et al., supra note 5, at 119.  
29. AAIDD, Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, 
and Systems of Supports 5 (11th ed. 2010) [hereinafter AAIDD 
Manual]; see also FAQ on Intellectual Disability, AAIDD, 
http://www.aaidd.org/content_104.cfm?navID=22 (last visited Feb. 15, 
2013). 
30. Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability and the AAIDD 
Definition, AAIDD, http://www.aaidd.org/content_185.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2013).  
31. Id.  
32. Schalock et al., supra note 5. 
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was motivated by a desire to be less offensive to persons with 
disabilities.33 
The AAIDD’s most current definition of intellectual disability has 
three prongs: (1) a limitation in intellectual functioning, (2) limitations 
in adaptive behavior, and (3) an age of onset before age eighteen.34 The 
first prong, “intellectual functioning,” relates to a person’s overall mental 
capacity, “such as learning, reasoning, problem solving, and so on.”35 IQ 
tests are typically used to measure intellectual functioning, and almost 
all state statutes and state courts utilize IQ tests to determine whether a 
capital defendant has limited intellectual functioning.36  
The second prong of the intellectual disability definition is limited 
adaptive behavior, which the AAIDD characterizes as comprised of three 
skill sets: conceptual skills, social skills, and practice skills.37 Conceptual 
abilities include “language and literacy; money, time, and number 
concepts; and self-direction.”38 Social capabilities include “interpersonal 
skills, social responsibility, self-esteem, gullibility, naïveté (i.e., wariness), 
social problem solving, and the ability to follow rules/obey laws and to 
avoid being victimized.”39 Finally, adaptive behavior is also measured by 
practical skills, which the AAIDD defines as “activities of daily living 
[such as] (personal care), occupational skills, healthcare, 
travel/transportation, schedules/routines, safety, use of money, [and] use 
of the telephone.”40 The third prong of the intellectual disability 
definition is age of onset, which requires characteristics of limited 
intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior skills to originate before 
age eighteen.  
B. Current APA Definition and the Revised DSM-V 
The APA’s most recent publication of the DSM is the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR), 
 
33. World’s Oldest Organization on Intellectual Disability Has a Progressive 
New Name, AAIDD, http://www.aaidd.org/content_1314.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
34. Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability and the AAIDD 
Definition, AAIDD, http://www.aaidd.org/content_185.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2013). Almost all State statutes and court decisions require 
satisfaction of these three prongs or a variation of these three prongs. See 
Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 15. 
35. Definition of Intellectual Disability, AAIDD, http://www.aaidd.org/ 
content_100.cfm?navID=21 (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
36. Id.  
37. Id.  
38. Id.  
39. Id.  
40. Id.  
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which was published in 2000.41 The DSM-IV-TR’s current definition of 
intellectual disability is similar to the AAIDD’s definition, and the 
Atkins Court also quoted the DSM-IV-TR’s definition while considering 
how to define intellectual disability.42 The APA defines the disorder as:  
[Significant] subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion 
A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive 
functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: 
communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, 
use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic 
skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset 
must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C).43 
The DSM-IV-TR’s definition breaks down intellectual disability into four 
categories: (1) mild intellectual disability, which is demonstrated by an 
IQ level of 50–55 to approximately 70; (2) moderate intellectual 
disability, which is shown by an IQ of 35–40 to 50–55; (3) severe 
intellectual disability, which is evidenced by an IQ of 20–25 to 35–40; 
and (4) profound intellectual disability, which is illustrated by an IQ 
below 20 or 25.44 Because the APA and AAIDD definitions of intellectual 
disability are so similar, it may be difficult for laypersons, attorneys, and 
judges to differentiate between them. Some practitioners have said that 
the “DSM-IV-TR definition differs from the [AAIDD] definition in that 
it retains the concept of ‘levels’ of [intellectual disability]”.45 This is 
evidenced by the APA’s breakdown of IQ scores into four categories. 
Because some states have adopted the AAIDD’s definition while others 
have adopted the APA’s definition through statute or case law,46 it is 
essential to recognize the variations between the definitions to 
 
41. The DSM is updated and revised routinely to illustrate the most up-to-date 
diagnoses and symptoms of particular diseases. See DSM-IV-TR, APA, 
http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm/dsm-iv-tr (last visited Feb. 15, 
2013). The DSM remains current throughout several years without any 
revisions because many diagnoses and symptoms have a settled definition 
amongst mental healthcare practitioners. Id. This is evidenced by a six-
year gap between publication of the DSM-IV in 1994 and the revision in 
the DSM-IV-TR in 2000. See id.  
42. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002).  
43. Id at 308 n.3; see also APA, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders 41 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. The 
definition set forth in the DSM-IV-TR retains the term “mental 
retardation,” because the manual was published before the term 
intellectual disability took hold in 2007. See id. 
44. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 43, at 42.  
45. Patricia Ainsworth & Pamela Baker, Understanding Mental 
Retardation 68 (2004).  
46. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 15.  
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understand the challenges intellectually disabled capital defendants face 
in different jurisdictions. 
The APA is currently working on an updated version of the DSM, 
the DSM-V, which will be released in May 2013.47 In developing the 
DSM-V and revising the definition of intellectual disability, the APA 
sought feedback from the AAIDD to determine what changes should be 
made to its definition of intellectual disability.48 The APA is committed 
to changing its terminology from “mental retardation” to “intellectual 
disability” as did the AAIDD in 2007.49 One of the APA’s rationales for 
changing the term to intellectual disability is “consistency with AAIDD” 
practices.50 This move is significant because it demonstrates that the two 
largest mental health organizations in the United States are working 
together to unify their definitions of intellectual disability. States should 
do the same. 
The DSM-V will rename intellectual disability “Intellectual 
Developmental Disorder.”51 Like the AAIID, the DSM-V will 
characterize the disorder as having three criteria.52 The first two are 
 
47. DSM-V Development Timeline, APA, http://www.dsm5.org/ 
about/Pages/Timeline.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). The DSM-V will 
be released at the APA annual convention which is scheduled for May 18-
22, 2013 in San Francisco, California. Id.  
48. See Letter from AAIDD 11th Edition Implementation Committee to DSM-
V ASD and Developmental Disorders Subgroup, ID Subcommittee, Public 
Comments Regarding Draft Definition of Intellectual Disability (Feb. 22, 
2010), available at http://www.aaidd.org/media/PDFs/DSMV.pdf. 
49. Schalock et al., supra note 5. As evidence of its commitment, the APA 
announced in a 2009 report of the DSM-V work group that the DSM-IV’s 
use of the term “[m]ental retardation to describe cognitive  
deficits . . . is outdated and considered pejorative by many . . ., [thus] the 
work group is considering a change to the term ‘[i]ntellectual disabilities.’” 
Susan Swedo, Report of the DSM-V Neurodevelopmental 
Disorders Work Group (Apr. 2009), http://www.dsm5.org/ 
progressreports/pages/0904reportofthedsmvneurodevelopmentaldisorders 
workgroup.aspx. 
50. Intellectual Developmental Disorder Rationale, APA, 
http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx? 
rid=384# (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).  
51. Id.  
52. The three criteria are: deficits in general mental abilities, limitations and 
significant impairment in adaptive functioning, and onset during the 
developmental period. Intellectual Developmental Disorder Proposed 
Revision, APA, http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/ 
proposedrevision.aspx?rid=384# (last visited Feb. 15, 2012). The AAIDD 
urged the APA to “not specify a hard and fast cutoff point/score for 
meeting the significant limitations criteria for both intelligence and 
adaptive behavior scores. Rather, one needs to use clinical judgment in 
interpreting the obtained score in reference to the test’s standard error of 
measurement.” See Letter from AAIDD, supra note 48. 
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substantially similar to the AAIDD; however, the DSM-V’s third 
criterion is a substantial change from prior definitions that required an 
age of onset before age eighteen.53 The APA’s proposed age-of-onset 
requirement is “onset during the developmental period.”54 This is a 
broader standard than a strict age-of-onset requirement of eighteen years 
because a person who has not shown any symptoms before his eighteenth 
birthday but shows symptoms beginning at the age of nineteen and 
through the early adult years may still be in a developmental period in 
his life. Without providing a more detailed definition for what 
constitutes one’s “developmental period” or providing any reasoning for 
eliminating the strict age-of-onset requirement, the APA could be 
opening up floodgates for future litigation in Atkins claims regarding 
whether the language refers to an age of onset prior to eighteen or 
whether it is now a broader standard. If the APA is in fact promulgating 
a broader standard for determining who qualifies as intellectually 
disabled, this could significantly help intellectually disabled defendants 
making an Atkins claim who did not show symptoms prior to the age of 
eighteen. However, because the term “developmental period” is 
ambiguous, it may cause the legal community more confusion when 
courts attempt to apply this vague standard. Judges and juries are not 
equipped to ascertain what “developmental period” means without 
guidance from the APA, and this imprecise language may result in 
courts deferring to the traditional standard of an age of onset prior to 
age eighteen.  
II. Substantive Differences Between Various State 
Statutes and Case Law 
The principal problem with the Atkins decision is the Court’s failure 
to establish a bright-line test for determining when a defendant is 
intellectually disabled and thus qualifies for the death penalty exception. 
Although many states generally follow the definitions set forth by the 
AAIDD and the APA, several states have different standards for what 
constitutes intellectual disability. Whether defined by statute or case 
law, states differ on how to satisfy the fundamental three-pronged test 
promulgated by both the AAIDD and the APA.55  
 
53. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 43, at 41. See also Definition of Intellectual 
Disability, AAIDD, http://www.aaidd.org/content_100.cfm?navID=21 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
54. Intellectual Developmental Disorder, APA, http://www.dsm5.org/ 
ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=384# (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2013).  
55. See supra Parts I.A–B for a discussion of the three-pronged tests 
established by the AAIDD and APA. Most state statutes and court 
decisions require satisfaction of these three prongs or a variation of these 
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A.  Varying IQ Cutoff Scores and Presumptions of Intellectual  
Disability 
A generally accepted way to determine a limitation in intellectual 
functioning is testing a defendant’s IQ. There are different types of IQ 
tests, but it is typically accepted that an intellectual disability is 
demonstrated by an IQ of 50–55 to approximately 70.56 Because of this 
definition, several states have varying IQ cutoff scores for determining 
whether an individual suffers from an intellectual disability.  
1.  Different IQ Cutoff Scores 
Imagine a man on trial whose life or death hinges on the definition 
of intellectual disability. He has taken an IQ test and scored a seventy-
one. He has psychologists testify that he is intellectually disabled even 
though his IQ test score is higher than what is typically recognized as 
intellectually disabled by the DSM-IV-TR. If this man were tried in 
California, he would likely be found intellectually disabled despite his 
higher IQ test score. California is one of the most lenient states 
regarding IQ cutoff scores because the California Penal Code defines 
“intellectually disabled” as “the condition of significantly subaverage 
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive 
behavior and manifested before the age of 18.”57 This definition conforms 
to the definitions promulgated by the AAIDD and the APA, except that 
it does not mention an IQ cutoff score. Because of this, the Supreme 
Court of California declined to adopt an “IQ of 70 as the upper limit for 
making a prima facie showing [of intellectual disability].”58 Instead, the 
court held that “a fixed cutoff is inconsistent with established clinical 
definitions and fails to recognize that significantly subaverage 
intellectual functioning may be established by means other than IQ 
testing.”59 The court also stated that “IQ test scores are insufficiently 
precise to utilize a fixed cutoff in this context.”60 Thus, the man who 
scores a seventy or above on an IQ test in California would be able to 
present more evidence to prove his intellectual disability and have a 
better chance of avoiding execution. 
Now picture the same man on trial in Kentucky. The Kentucky 
Penal Code requires an individual to have an IQ score of 70 or below to 
be considered intellectually disabled.61 If this man, who has an IQ test  
three prongs. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 
15. 
56. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 43. 
57. Cal. Penal Code § 1376(a) (West 2012). 
58. In re Hawthorne, 105 P.3d 552, 557 (Cal. 2005).  
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.130(2) (West 2012). 
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score of 71, were tried in Kentucky, he would not be found intellectually 
disabled and could be sentenced to death. This is a drastic difference 
from California’s lenient policy of not requiring a strict IQ cutoff score. 
Kentucky’s strict statute allows for the potential execution of this man 
because of one meager point on an IQ test, whereas the same man would 
likely live in California. 
2. IQ Scores as Rebuttable Presumptions 
Some states treat IQ scores as presumptive evidence of intellectual 
disability or the lack thereof. Imagine that the same man above, who 
scored a 71 on an IQ test, is on trial in Illinois. The Illinois statute 
defining intellectual disability states that “[a]n intelligence quotient of 75 
or below is presumptive evidence of an intellectual disability.”62 Thus, 
this same man would benefit from a presumption of intellectual 
disability in Illinois and would likely not be sentenced to death. 
Although the Illinois statute is one of the more lenient statutes in the 
United States, it is not as lenient as the California statute which does 
not specify an IQ cutoff score. 
Now envision the same man on trial in Ohio. In State v. Lott, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio held that “there is a rebuttable presumption 
that a defendant is not [intellectually disabled] if his or her IQ is above 
70.”63 The difference between the California and Illinois statutes and 
Ohio case law is that the same man who scores a 71 on an IQ test in 
Ohio has a greater burden than he would have in California and Illinois 
for proving the existence of an intellectual disability because Ohio 
presumes no intellectual disability when a defendant’s IQ scores are 
above 70. Ohio case law also differs from the Kentucky statute because 
Kentucky does not provide for a rebuttable presumption at all, but 
instead has a strict IQ cutoff score of seventy for finding the existence of 
an intellectual disability. 
To rebut Ohio’s presumption of no intellectual disability, this same 
man would have to rely more heavily on proving the other two prongs of 
the intellectual disability definition: (1) age of onset before eighteen 
years old and (2) significant limitations in adaptive functioning.64 For 
example, in Lott, the Supreme Court of Ohio accepted affidavits from 
the defendant’s “family and friends showing personality problems and 
behavioral indicators of early-life trauma”65 to prove limitations in 
adaptive behavior prior to age eighteen. In Kentucky, however, no 
evidence of adaptive behavior is accepted if the defendant’s IQ test score 
 
62. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/114-15(d) (2012). 
63. State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ohio 2002) (emphasis added). 
64. Id. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that “[t]he trial court should rely on 
professional evaluations of . . . mental status, and consider expert 
testimony . . . .” Id. at 1015.  
65. Id. at 1013. 
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is above 70.66 California, on the other hand, recognizes the importance of 
not having a fixed IQ cutoff score and thus eases the burden on 
defendants attempting to prove an intellectual disability.67  
Now envision a different man with an IQ test score of 66. This man 
would most likely be sentenced to death in Arkansas because of different 
state standards. The statute in Arkansas defining intellectual disability 
states that “there is a rebuttable presumption of [intellectual disability] 
when a defendant has an intelligence quotient of sixty-five or below.”68 
Arkansas places a higher burden on the defendant to prove intellectual 
disability through age of onset and adaptive behavior requirements if the 
defendant’s IQ score is above 65, as opposed to the Ohio standard of 70 
or below and the Illinois standard of 75 or below. This statute is one of 
the strictest statutes in the United States.69 Despite the APA 
recommendation that intellectual disability is demonstrated by an IQ 
level of 50–55 to approximately 70,70 Arkansas allows individuals who 
would be considered intellectually disabled in a majority of states to be 
sentenced to death.71  
B. Differences in Defining Limitations in Adaptive Behavior  
Although both the AAIDD and the APA have defined adaptive 
behavior and what constitutes a limitation in adaptive functioning,72 
several states have varying definitions of what adaptive functioning 
actually is. This in turn causes drastic variations in what evidence 
defendants are required to present to prove this element of intellectual 
disability. According to the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Coleman v. 
State, limitations in adaptive behavior means an individual is unable to 
adapt to surrounding circumstances.73 Although this definition is similar  
66. See Bowling v. Kentucky, 163 S.W.3d 361, 373 (Ky. 2005). 
67. In re Hawthorne, 105 P.3d 552, 557 (Cal. 2005). 
68. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618 (2012). 
69. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 15. Another 
state that imposes strict IQ cutoff scores is Arizona. The Supreme Court of 
Arizona held that “an IQ of sixty-five or below establishes a rebuttable 
presumption of [intellectual disability].” State v. Arellano, 143 P.3d 1015, 
1018 (Ariz. 2006).  
70. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 43. 
71. For example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that “[b]ecause the 
DSM-IV definition recognizes a measurement error of five points in 
assessing I.Q., persons with I.Q.s between 70 and 75 who exhibit significant 
deficits in adaptive behavior may be [intellectually disabled].” State v. 
Jimenez, 908 A.2d 181, 184 n.3 (N.J. 2006). 
72. Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability and the AAIDD 
Definition, AAIDD, http://www.aaidd.org/content_185.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2013). See also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 43.  
73. Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221, 248 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. 
Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 918 (Tenn. 2003)). 
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to the AAIDD’s, it is not identical. The Supreme Court of Tennessee 
narrows its definition of adaptive behavior by noting that “[an 
intellectually disabled] person will have significant limitations in at least 
two of the following basic skills: communication, self-care, home living, 
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, 
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety.”74 The court 
noted that it drew its definition of adaptive behavior from the APA’s 
DSM-IV because mental health practitioners rely on the DSM-IV in 
diagnosing mental disorders.75 However, the AAIDD is also relied upon 
in the mental health field, leading the states that rely on its definition to 
follow a slightly different standard.76  
In Ex Parte Briseno, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted 
the AAIDD’s definition and noted that impairments in adaptive 
behavior consist of substantial impairments in a person’s ability to meet 
the expected cultural and age-appropriate “standards of maturation, 
learning, personal independence, and/or social responsibility.”77 This 
definition may be a stricter standard to meet than the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee’s definition, which narrows the requirement of limited 
adaptive behavior. The Supreme Court of Tennessee, adopting the APA, 
only requires deficits in at least two basic adaptive behavior skills 
whereas the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals does not specify a 
particular number of skills that should be impaired.78 Instead, the Texas 
court’s definition, following the AAIDD, is categorically broad and thus 
strict because it could be argued that the Texas court’s definition of 
limited adaptive behavior requires an intellectually disabled defendant to 
show impairments in all areas of adaptive behavior skills,79 as opposed to 
 
74. Id. (quoting Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 785 (Tenn. 2001)) 
(emphasis added).  
75. Id. 
76. For example, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “[u]ntil the 
Texas Legislature provides an alternate statutory definition of ‘[intellectual 
disability]’ for use in capital sentencing, we will follow the [AAIDD].” Ex 
Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
77. Id. at 7 n.25; see also Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.  
§ 591.003 (1) (2012). 
78. Basic adaptive behavior skills include: “communication, self-care, home 
living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, 
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety.” Coleman v. 
State, 341 S.W.3d 221, 248 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Van Tran v. State, 66 
S.W.3d 790, 785 (Tenn. 2001)); see also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 43. 
79. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7. The AAIDD specifies that adaptive behavior is 
multi-dimensional made up of conceptual, social, and practical skills. 
Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability and the AAIDD 
Definition, AAIDD, http://www.aaidd.org/content_185.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2013). Examples of conceptual skills include “receptive and 
expressive language, reading and writing, money concepts [and] self-
directions.” Id. Examples of social skills include “interpersonal, 
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the Supreme Court of Tennessee’s requirement of demonstrating only 
two impairments.80 This is a significant difference because some states 
adopt the AAIDD’s definition of limited adaptive behavior, like Texas, 
while others adopt the APA’s definition, like Tennessee. Ultimately, the 
difference between the two definitions may drastically vary regarding 
what evidence defendants are required to present to prove limited 
adaptive functioning skills. 
 
C. Varying Age-of-Onset Requirements 
Because both the AAIDD and the APA definitions of intellectual 
disability describe the disability as originating before age eighteen,81 the 
majority of states have adopted this requirement through legislation or 
case law.82 However, some states have instituted a lower standard for the 
defendant by liberalizing the age-of-onset requirement. In Maryland, “a 
defendant is [intellectually disabled] if . . . the [intellectual disability] 
was manifested before the age of 22 years.”83 By increasing the age of 
onset to twenty-two, defendants facing the death penalty have an 
additional four years of evidence to present to the court and jury 
regarding onset of intellectual disability compared to states with a strict 
age eighteen cutoff. Like Maryland, an Indiana statute also states that 
an intellectual disability must manifest before age twenty-two.84 In Witt 
v. State, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that when evaluating 
whether a defendant has an intellectual disability, “[s]ubsequent tests 
may be of less significance, but the overall evaluation including behavior 
and tests after age twenty-two may be relevant.”85 These two states 
represent the most relaxed standard for the age-of-onset requirement.86  
 
responsibility, self-esteem, gullibility, . . . naiveté, follows rules, obeys laws, 
[and] avoids victimization.” Id. Examples of practical skills include: 
“personal activities of daily living such as eating, dressing, mobility and 
toileting[;] [i]nstrumental activities of daily living such as preparing meals, 
taking medication, using the telephone, managing money, using 
transportation, and doing housekeeping activities [and] occupational skills.” 
Id.  
80. See Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221, 248 (Tenn. 2011); see DSM-IV-TR, 
supra note 43. 
81. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 43. Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual 
Disability and the AAIDD Definition, AAIDD, http://www.aaidd.org/ 
content_185.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
82. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 15.  
83. MD. Code Ann. Crim. Law § 2-202(b)(1)(ii) (LexisNexis 2012). 
84. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-36-9-2 (West 2012).  
85. Witt v. State, 938 N.E.2d 1193, 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing  
Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 106 (Ind. 2005)). 
86. Although there are individuals with traumatic brain injuries occurring later 
in life that exhibit symptoms identical to those diagnosed with an 
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III. Procedural Differences and Variations in Burden 
of Proof 
A. A Judge or Jury Decision? 
Another issue that the Supreme Court failed to address in Atkins is 
whether the determination of a defendant’s intellectual disability—in 
essence, the determination of life or death—should be in the hands of a 
judge or jury. Because of the failure of the Atkins Court to address and 
standardize this issue, some states allow the determination of a capital 
defendant’s intellectual disability to be made by the judge in a pre-trial 
hearing.87 However, several cases since Atkins consist of a capital 
defendant arguing that there is a Sixth Amendment88 “right to a speedy 
and public trial by an impartial jury” regarding whether the defendant is 
intellectually disabled. In Ex Parte Briseno, Mr. Briseno claimed that he 
was entitled to a jury determination regarding his intellectual disability 
based on Atkins.89 However, the Texas court held that “Atkins [does] not 
require a post-conviction jury determination of [an] applicant’s claim of 
[intellectual disability].”90  
Like the Texas court, the Supreme Court of California has held that 
there is no constitutional right to a jury trial for post-conviction claims.91 
The California Supreme Court distinguished between pre-conviction and 
post-conviction defendants by allowing pre-convicted defendants the 
option of an evidentiary hearing with a judge as the sole fact finder or a 
jury trial, while post-conviction defendants do not have the option for a 
jury trial after conviction.92 Pre-conviction and post-conviction 
defendants are treated differently because there is no constitutional or 
statutory imperative to treat them the same in this context.93 
In New Jersey, a capital defendant has four opportunities to present 
evidence regarding a claim of intellectual disability: [1] “at pretrial 
before the trial court; [2] before a jury during the guilt phase [of] trial; 
[3] at a separate hearing before a jury after the guilt phase [of] trial; and, 
 
intellectual disability, the scope of this Note does not include whether 
individuals with traumatic brain injuries should be considered intellectually 
disabled within the definitions set out by the AAIDD and the APA.  
87. See Bowling v. Kentucky, 163 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Ky. 2005); see Ky. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 532.135 (West 2012); People v. Vasquez, 84 P.3d 1019, 1023 
(Colo. 2004) (holding that a defendant must prove intellectual disability by 
clear and convincing evidence in a pre-trial hearing).  
88. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
89. Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
90. Id. at 9. 
91. See In re Hawthorne, 105 P.3d 552, 558 (Cal. 2005).  
92. Id.  
93. Id.  
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finally, [4] before a jury at the penalty-phase [of] trial as mitigation.”94 
Similarly, the Arizona legislature “requires a pretrial hearing at which a 
defendant may attempt to show . . . that he has [an intellectual 
disability]; if he fails to make that showing, the defendant may still 
present evidence [of an intellectual disability] to the jury in mitigation of 
his sentence.”95 
In Ohio, courts are allowed to conduct de novo reviews of the 
evidence to determine whether a defendant is intellectually disabled.96 
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that a judge, not a jury, should make 
the determination of whether a capital defendant is intellectually 
disabled.97 Thus, “a trial court’s ruling on [intellectual disability] should 
be conducted in a manner comparable to a ruling on competency  
(i.e., the judge, not the jury decides the issue.)”98 These state variations 
regarding judge or jury determinations result in a greater burden on 
some defendants.99 Those defendants living in states that allow pre-trial 
hearings must convince only one person—the judge—of an intellectual 
disability, whereas defendants in other states must convince an entire 
jury. Although convincing a judge is not an easy burden, it may be less 
of a burden on the defendant than having to convince a group of laymen 
who may be more prejudiced than a judge.  
B. Varying Qualifications for Testifying Experts 
The criteria for who is qualified to testify as an expert regarding a 
capital defendant’s intellectual disability are not addressed in either the 
AAIDD or APA definitions of intellectual disability.100 Also, because the 
Atkins Court failed to set any standards regarding what qualifications 
are required for experts to testify on behalf of defendants, some states do 
not have any required qualifications.101 All states should have a standard 
 
94. State v. Jimenez, 908 A.2d 181, 192 (N.J. 2006). 
95. State v. Grell, 135 P.3d 696, 703 (Ariz. 2006). Additionally, the court 
pointed out that “[a]ll defendants who do not prove mental retardation at 
the pretrial hearing retain the ability to present mental retardation 
evidence to the jury.” Id. at 704. 
96. State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ohio 2002). 
97. Id.  
98. Id.  
99. See Jimenez, 908 A.2d at 189. 
100. Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability and the AAIDD 
Definition, AAIDD, http://www.aaidd.org/content_185.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2013); see also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 43; In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 
444, 446 (5th Cir. 2005).  
101. For example, California’s statute states that “[if] the prosecution seeks the 
death penalty, the defendant may . . . apply for . . . an [intellectual 
disability] hearing [to] be conducted [and] upon the submission of a 
declaration by a qualified expert stating his . . . opinion . . .[,] the court 
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for qualifications required of testifying experts because not all 
psychologists and psychiatrists are accustomed to working with patients 
with intellectual disabilities. By not implementing a standard for 
testifying experts, some states risk executing an intellectually disabled 
individual due to reliance on the testimony of inexperienced “experts.” 
The AAIDD recommends that a defendant’s intellectual disability 
assessment be done by a specialized professional.102 Specifically, the 
AAIDD states that “[a]ssessment data should be reported by an 
examiner experienced with people who have [intellectual disabilities]; 
who is qualified in terms of professional and state regulations; and who 
has met . . . guidelines for conducting a thorough, valid psychological 
evaluation of the individual’s intellectual functioning.”103 
Mr. Jose Garcia Briseno suffered due to his state’s failure to 
implement standards for testifying experts.104 In Ex Parte Briseno, a 
Texas court stated that “what constitutes [intellectual disability] in a 
particular case varies sharply depending upon who performs the analysis 
and the methodology used.”105 The defense expert specialized in the 
treatment of intellectual disability and mental illness, whereas the state’s 
expert specialized in statistical methodology and forensic diagnosis.106 
The defense’s expert focused on looking for “the person’s adaptive 
deficits and limitations [while] putting aside his positive adaptive  
skills . . . [and concentrating on] socially acceptable and successful 
skills.”107 However, the state’s expert emphasized “the person’s positive 
adaptive abilities and coping skills . . . [and focused on] whether the 
person has rational responses to external situations.”108  
Because of the differences in expertise, backgrounds, and experience, 
the defense’s expert diagnosed Mr. Briseno with an intellectual disability 
whereas the state’s expert found no intellectual disability but rather an 
antisocial personality disorder, which is not a defense against the death 
penalty.109 Ultimately, Mr. Briseno did not prove that he had 
impairments in adaptive behavior. His IQ score of 72 was too high, and 
the Texas court held that he did not have an intellectual disability110. It  
shall order a hearing.” Cal. Penal Code § 1376 (b)(1) (West 2012) 
(emphasis added). Although the statute refers to a “qualified expert,” it 
does not define what qualifications a “qualified expert” must have. 
102. AAIDD Manual, supra note 29, at 40.  
103. Id. at 40-41. 
104. See Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
105. Id. at 13. 
106. Id.  
107. Id.  
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 14, 18. 
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is possible that the court would have come to a different conclusion if 
both experts had expertise in the area of intellectual disabilities. This 
expertise could have instead inspired similar expert conclusions about 
limitations in adaptive behavior.  
C. Divergent Standards for Defendants’ Burden of Proof 
After the Atkins decision, many states implemented their own 
procedures for determining whether a capital defendant is intellectually 
disabled. In doing so, “every state that has addressed the issue has found 
that the defendant should bear the burden of proof on an Atkins 
claim.”111 However, the critical issue became what burden of proof to 
apply in Atkins situations: by a preponderance of the evidence, clear and 
convincing evidence,112 or beyond a reasonable doubt. States place 
varying burdens on defendants attempting to prove intellectual 
disabilities, and that may be detrimental to capital defendants in 
jurisdictions with higher burdens.  
The Indiana Supreme Court has refused to impose a clear and 
convincing evidence standard and has instead adopted a preponderance 
of the evidence standard. The court explained that such a high burden of 
proof for the defendant “‘would result in execution of some persons who 
are [intellectually disabled]’ and that ‘the defendant’s right not to be 
executed if [intellectually disabled] outweighs the state’s interest’ in 
imposing the death penalty.”113 However, other states require a clear and 
convincing evidence standard. In Arizona v. Grell, the Arizona Supreme 
Court held that “a defendant may attempt to show, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that he has an [intellectual disability].”114 Although 
some states require a clear and convincing evidence standard, those 
opting to reject this high burden of proof argue that “the definitive 
inquiry is the assessment of the relative risks faced by the parties: the 
defendant’s risk of death compared to the state’s minimal interest in 
executing a defendant who will otherwise go to prison for life.”115  
In Hill v. Schofield, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, applying 
Georgia law, determined that a beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
 
111. State v. Jimenez, 908 A.2d 181, 188 (N.J. 2006). 
112. Clear and convincing evidence is defined as “evidence indicating that the 
thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain . . . this is a 
greater burden than preponderance of the evidence . . . but less than 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.” Black’s Law Dictionary 256 (3d 
ed. 2006). 
113. Jimenez, 908 A.2d at 188 (quoting Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 103 
(Ind. 2005), aff’d, 903 N.E.2d 899 (Ind. 2009)). 
114. State v. Grell, 135 P.3d 696, 703 (Ariz. 2006). 
115. Id. at 704. 
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places too high a burden on intellectually disabled defendants.116 The 
court reiterated the concerns of the Supreme Court in Atkins and stated 
that intellectually disabled “defendants are unable to contribute fully to 
their defenses . . . [because] of a lack of knowledge of basic facts, and an 
increased susceptibility to the influence of authority figures.”117 
Additionally, because of the subjective nature of determining whether a 
defendant has an intellectual disability, “the reasonable doubt standard 
unquestionably will result in the execution of those offenders that Atkins 
protects.”118 On appeal, the court upheld a beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard for individuals claiming intellectual disability.119 The decision 
elicited strong dissents, arguing that “[r]equiring proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, when applied to the highly subjective determination of 
[intellectual disability], eviscerates the Eighth Amendment constitutional 
right of all [intellectually disabled] offenders not to be executed, contrary 
to Atkins v. Virginia.”120 Most states, however, apply a preponderance of 
the evidence standard, because these states recognize that intellectually 
disabled defendants make poor witnesses.121  
IV. The Need for a New Intellectual Disability 
Standard 
A. Why a Change in the Law Is Needed 
Several years ago, people with intellectual disabilities were ostracized 
and faced harsh discrimination, including being labeled “imbeciles.”122 
The early prejudices against people with mental disabilities resulted in 
 
116. Hill v. Schofield, 608 F.3d 1272, 1281 (11th Cir. 2010), vacated, 625 F.3d 
1335 (11th Cir.), and aff’d en banc sub nom, Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 
1335 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2727 (2012), reh’g denied, 
2012 WL 3761964 (Aug. 31, 2012) (holding that a beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard for individuals claiming intellectual disability is not 
unconstitutional). 
117. Schofield, 608 F.3d at 1281 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 
(2002)).  
118. Id.  
119. Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1360 (11th Cir. 2011). 
120. Id. at 1365 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
121. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). In State v. Lott, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio held that the defendant “bears the burden of 
establishing that he is [intellectually disabled] by a preponderance of the 
evidence.” 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ohio 2002). Similarly, the Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals also held that a capital defendant “bears the burden of 
proof, by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 
1, 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).  
122. See Robert Perske, Coming Out of the Darkness: America’s Criminal 
Justice System and Persons with Intellectual Disabilities in the 20th 
Century, 45 Intell. & Developmental Disabilities 216, 216 (2007). 
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many living out their lives in isolated institutions.123 However, starting in 
the 1950’s, the nation’s view of people with intellectual disabilities began 
to change.124 By the time Atkins was decided, there had been a 
transformative shift in society’s opinions and views regarding persons 
with intellectual disabilities.125 This evolution played a critical role in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins.126 The Atkins Court overruled Penry 
v. Lynaugh, a 1989 decision where the Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment did not prohibit the death sentence for intellectually 
disabled defendants.127 The Atkins Court relied on evidence of the 
nation’s “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”128 This evidence was based on the Court’s finding that 
a number of states had outlawed the death penalty for intellectually 
disabled persons. The Court emphasized the “consistency in the direction 
of change”129 and noted that “today our society views [intellectually 
disabled] offenders as categorically less culpable than the average 
criminal”130 because their intellectual disabilities impair their “[capacity] 
to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract 
from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, 
to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.”131  
Because the goal of the Atkins decision was to ensure that all 
intellectually disabled persons are constitutionally protected from the 
death penalty,132 this goal is undermined when some states incorporate 
inadequate protective standards that lead to death for some 
intellectually disabled persons. Although the Atkins Court allowed states 
to develop their own ways of enforcing its holding,133 there may be a 
better way to apply Atkins’ constitutional restriction through a new 
model standard for determining intellectual disability.  
 
123. See id. at 217.  
124. Id.  
125. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 (2002). 
126. See id. at 320. 
127. Penry v. Lynaugh 492 US. 302, 340 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
128. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.  
129. Id. at 315.  
130. Id. at 316. 
131. Id. at 318. 
132. See id. 
133. Id. at 317.  
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B.  Substantive Differences 
1. The Effect of Varying IQ Cutoff Scores 
Although IQ tests are objective and easy to administer,134 there are 
limits to their reliability.135 Psychologists have stated that “[a] major 
issue confronting the courts in Atkins cases resides in their 
understanding (or misunderstanding) of what intelligence tests measure 
and how well they measure the construct of intelligence.”136 Generally, 
courts have a difficult time understanding that intellectually disabled 
individuals can have more than one true IQ score.137 This is due to the 
IQ test scores’ standard error of measurement, which is clear to 
psychologists but not to judges or juries responsible for deciding Atkins 
cases. The standard error of measurement accounts for a “band of error 
concept” that is plus or minus five points from the test taker’s score.138 
For example, an individual who scores a 70 on an IQ test actually has a 
score anywhere between 65 and 75. However, because courts do not 
understand the standard error of measurement, courts have held that 
“use of the standard error of measurement to lower an IQ score could 
just as likely be used to raise an IQ score, and that the use of such a 
statistic is inherently ‘speculative.’”139  
Another problem with IQ tests is the phenomenon known as the 
Flynn Effect. This phenomenon is the “general upward trend in IQ 
scores” over several years.140 An upward trend in test scores occurs 
because “IQ test norms become obsolete . . . [and] intelligence test norms 
have to periodically be recalibrated to maintain their accuracy in 
reflecting an individual’s level of intelligence.”141 This is a critical issue, 
 
134. William Lichten & Elliott W. Simon, Defining Mental Retardation: A 
Matter of Life or Death, 45 Intell. & Developmental Disabilities 
335, 337 (2007). 
135. Id. at 338. 
136. Frank M. Gresham, Interpretation of Intelligence Test Scores in Atkins 
Cases: Conceptual and Psychometric Issues, 16 Applied 
Neuropsychology 91, 92-93 (2009).  
137. Id. at 93. 
138. Id. at 94. 
139. Id.  
140. Id. at 93.  
141. Id. Re-calibrating an IQ test requires the test to be normed. When an IQ 
test is re-calibrated, higher raw scores are assigned to obtain an IQ score of 
100 than was previously necessary to achieve the same score. “Thus, over 
the course of the past century, a higher and higher proportion of questions 
had to be answered correctly to obtain the identical IQ score of the prior 
cohort.” Stephen J. Ceci et al., The Difficulty of Basing Death Penalty 
Eligibility on IQ Cutoff Scores for Mental Retardation, 13 Ethics & 
Behavior 11, 12 (2003). 
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because psychologists have determined that “Americans gain an average 
of approximately 0.3 IQ points per year or 3 points per decade in 
measured intelligence.”142 If an IQ test has not been recalibrated 
recently, a capital defendant on death row could possibly score higher on 
the test than his actual IQ score, which would result in execution.  
Because of the gravity of the situation, mental health professionals 
have pointed out that high-stakes decisions involving life and death 
should not be made based on a single test score,143 especially when that 
single test score is affected by the Flynn Effect which can produce IQ 
scores that effectively move defendants out of the range of intellectual 
disability recognized by various states.144 Thus, states that fail to 
consider the Flynn Effect could ultimately put intellectually disabled 
individuals to death because of stricter IQ cutoff scores. Because of the 
Flynn Effect and the standard error of measurement, states should not 
apply a fixed IQ cutoff score. Rather, IQ score requirements should 
incorporate plus or minus five points from the test taker’s score. To 
determine whether individuals have an intellectual disability without 
considering the Flynn Effect and the standard error of measurement 
“would cause undue harm and would violate the Constitutional rights of 
these individuals.”145 
2. Subjective Determination of Adaptive Behavior 
Determining a capital defendant’s adaptive behavior skills is difficult 
and potentially problematic. Courts have stated that “[t]he adaptive 
behavior criteria are exceedingly subjective, and undoubtedly experts 
will be found to offer opinions on both sides of the issue in most 
cases.”146 Because the determination of an individual’s adaptive behavior 
skills could result in that individual’s execution, states should 
incorporate a standardized test to address the problem of subjectivity. 
The AAIDD states that “a comprehensive standardized measure of 
adaptive behavior should be used in making the determination of the 
individual’s current adaptive behavior functioning.”147 Similar to IQ 
tests, standardized adaptive behavior tests also suffer from a standard 
error of measure.148 Thus, courts using standardized adaptive behavior  
142. Frank M. Gresham & Daniel J. Reschly, Standard of Practice and Flynn 
Effect Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, 49 Intell. & Developmental 
Disabilities 131, 131 (2011). 
143. Lichten & Simon, supra note 134, at 336.  
144. Gresham & Reschly, supra note 142, at 135. 
145. Id. at 138. 
146. Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).  
147. AAIDD Manual, supra note 29, at 49. “The preferred adaptive behavior 
instrument should have current norms developed on a representative 
sample of the general population.” Id.  
148. See id. at 48. 
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tests should incorporate the standard error of measurement, and scores 
should be given a plus or minus one or two standard error of 
measurements from the individual’s actual score.149 
In addition to a standardized test, the AAIDD advocates that “[a] 
comprehensive assessment of adaptive behavior will likely include a 
systematic review of the individual’s family history, medical history, 
school records, employment records (if an adult), other relevant records 
and information, as well as clinical interviews with a person or persons 
who know the individual well.”150 Some courts have specifically 
determined particular questions that should be asked.151 For example, 
one question is: “Did those who knew the person best during the 
developmental stage—his family, friends, teachers, employers, 
authorities—think he was [intellectually disabled] at that time, and, if 
so, [does he] act in accordance with that determination?” Although such 
questions offer important evidence for establishing an individual’s limited 
adaptive behavior skills, evidence of an individual’s past should be 
considered in conjunction with a standardized test.152 In this way, the 
damaging effects of subjectivity can be limited and controlled. 
3. The Age-of-Onset Requirement Is Not Ideal  
The goal of the Atkins decision was to ensure that intellectually 
disabled persons were protected from the death penalty.153 Because the 
Supreme Court quoted the AAIDD and the APA’s definitions for 
intellectual disability and used these definitions in determining that 
people with intellectual disabilities are less culpable154, States have since 
required Atkins defendants show signs of subaverage intellectual 
functioning and limitations in adaptive behavior before age eighteen.155 
Although it seems like the age-of-onset requirement is the easiest 
element to satisfy, individuals have a hard time proving age of onset if 
they did not take an IQ test prior to age eighteen. This is a significant 
problem with the strict age eighteen cutoff requirement. For example, 
imagine two twenty-one-year-old men facing the death penalty in 
 
149. See id. at 49. 
150. Id. at 45. 
151. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8. Other questions are: “Has the person formulated 
plans and carried them through or is his conduct impulsive? Does his 
conduct show leadership or does it show that is he led around by others? Is 
his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate, 
regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?” Id.  
152. See infra Part IV.B.3 for a discussion on standardized tests used in 
determining limitations in adaptive behavior. 
153. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).  
154. See id. at 319. 
155. Id. at 318.  
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separate trials. Both have limitations in adaptive behavior, and both 
scored 68 on an IQ test. The only difference is that one man took an IQ 
test at age seventeen while the other took an IQ test at age nineteen. 
The man who took his IQ test at age nineteen would not qualify as 
intellectually disabled and could potentially be sentenced to death. The 
other man is constitutionally protected and cannot be executed. Is there 
a valid distinction between the two men besides the age at which they 
took an IQ test? In State v. McManus, the Supreme Court of Indiana 
held that “IQ tests alone are not necessarily conclusive, and courts may 
‘consider IQ scores together with other evidence of mental capacity’”156 
to determine whether intellectual disabilities developed prior to age 
eighteen. Because it is probable that not all individuals on trial have 
taken an IQ test as minors, it is important for courts to also consider 
various factors such as “work history, school history, and life 
functioning.”157  
Like the Indiana Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Nevada in 
Ybarra v. State, held that IQ testing is not required to prove age of 
onset of intellectual disability.158 The court stressed that “[o]ther 
evidence may be used to demonstrate subaverage intellectual 
functioning, such as school and other records.”159 In Ybarra, the 
defendant, Mr. Robert Ybarra, claimed that he suffered from an 
intellectual disability but was twenty-seven years old the first time he 
was given an IQ test.160 Because there was no standardized, objective IQ 
test score from before Mr. Ybarra’s eighteenth birthday to determine 
whether his age of onset was prior to eighteen, the court considered Mr. 
Ybarra’s “school, mental health, and military records.”161 The court 
reasoned that these records would provide a generalized assessment of 
Mr. Ybarra’s intellectual functioning prior to age eighteen.162 In fact, 
psychologists have also established that “particular attention should be 
given to the defendant’s school record, which provides a history of 
scholastic achievement . . . [and permits] the establishment of 
[intellectual disability] prior to age 18.”163 Although these cases suggest 
 
156. State v. McManus, 868 N.E.2d 778, 785 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Pruitt v. 
State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 106 (Ind. 2005)). 
157. Id.  
158. See Ybarra v. State, 247 P.3d 269, 274 (Nev. 2011), cert. denied sub nom, 
Ybarra v. Nevada, 132 S. Ct. 1904 (2012). 
159. Id.  
160. Id. at 278. 
161. Id. at 279. 
162. Id. 
163. George S. Baroff, Establishing Mental Retardation in Capital Cases: An 
Update, 41 Mental Retardation 198, 199 (2003). 
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that other evidence of intellectual disability is acceptable, other cases 
suggest that an IQ test score is the most important factor.164  
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Pennsylvania v. Vandivner, 
held that “the best evidence would be IQ testing conducted before [the 
defendant] was eighteen.”165 Mr. Vandivner was not found intellectually 
disabled because he had not taken an IQ test prior to age eighteen.166 
The court considered Mr. Vandivner’s school records and psychological 
records but concluded that Mr. Vandivner’s school records must indicate 
“that he was placed in special education classes due to [intellectual 
disabilities].”167 The court concluded this despite testimony from a school 
official that at the time Mr. Vandivner was in school, “there was no 
formalized procedure for placement in special education classes.”168 This 
case illustrates the difficulty individuals face in proving the age of onset 
when they did not take an IQ test before age eighteen.  
C. Procedural Differences: Determinations Made by Jury versus Judge 
Several studies discuss the stereotypes jurors have of people with 
intellectual disabilities.169 Most jurors believe that people with 
intellectual disabilities exhibit severe signs of [intellectual disability] 
whereas, “[t]he debate in Atkins cases has never been about individuals 
with more severe levels of intellectual disability. It has always been 
about persons who may be considered to have mild intellectual 
disability,”170 such as those individuals who may not exhibit severe 
symptoms. Researchers have found that “within the universe of all 
[intellectually disabled] individuals, 89% fall in the mildly [intellectually 
disabled] range, a fact the Supreme Court recognized many years before 
Atkins was decided.”171 Jurors may mistakenly believe that the defendant 
is not actually intellectually disabled because of society’s preprogrammed 
 
164. See Commonwealth v. Vandivner, 962 A.2d 1170, 1185 (Pa. 2009). 
165. Id.  
166. Id.  
167. Id.  
168. Id.  
169. See Marcus T. Boccaccini et al., Jury Pool Members’ Beliefs About the 
Relation Between Potential Impairments in Functioning and Mental 
Retardation: Implications for Atkins-Type Cases, 34 L. & Psychol. 
Rev. 1 (2010). 
170. Gresham & Reschly, supra note 142, at 132. Additionally, “mild 
intellectual disability has no identified or specified biological  
etiology.” Id. It is “most often diagnosed only at school entry or shortly 
thereafter, . . . [but sometimes] misdiagnosed as a learning disability.” Id. 
at 133.  
171. Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1367 (11th Cir. 2011) (Barkett, J., 
dissenting); see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 
n.9 (1985).  
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notion of how someone with an intellectual disability looks and acts. For 
example, 
[p]ersons with mild intellectual disability may ‘blend’ into society 
after school exit in that many are not officially diagnosed with 
intellectual disability in the adult years because they appear to 
function typically in community settings, whereas persons with 
severe forms of [intellectual disabilities] will always ‘stand out’ 
because of their physical anomalies and severe pervasive 
intellectual and adaptive behavior deficits.172  
It is understandably difficult for both judges and juries to determine 
whether an individual actually has an intellectual disability without any 
psychological training. Because of this lack of experience, “courts may 
have a preconceived notion of what intellectual disability looks like that 
is inconsistent with what mild intellectual disability looks like to 
professionals with training and experience in the field.”173 In fact, studies 
have confirmed that juries “harbor stereotypical views about [the 
abilities of intellectually disabled persons] and often expect them to have 
‘vastly lower abilities’ than persons without [intellectual disabilities].”174 
When society envisions people with intellectual disabilities, people 
typically assume that they are those with physical manifestations of 
mental disabilities, such as Down Syndrome, but people with severe 
mental disabilities are not the majority of defendants on trial in Atkins-
type cases.175 Thus, juries’ preconceived notions may make it harder for 
an intellectually disabled individual to overcome jury prejudice.  
Despite these concerns, should a judge be the sole determiner of an 
individual’s intellectual disability claim? Judges may be less influenced 
by crime details than juries176 and are better trained to divorce emotional 
feelings from factual determinations. However, despite vulnerability and 
possible preconceived notions of a jury, an individual’s life should not be 
in the hands of a single person. Even though courts have held that 
claims of intellectual disability do not require a jury determination to 
satisfy constitutional due process, judges can determine intellectual 
disability in a pre-trial hearing.177 Individuals facing execution should 
have the option of presenting facts and evidence to a jury of their peers.  
 
172. Gresham & Reschly, supra note 142, at 133.  
173. Id. 
174. Boccaccini et al., supra note 169, at 17. 
175. See Gresham & Reschly, supra note 142, at 135.  
176. Research shows that juries, when determining whether an individual has an 
intellectual disability, are influenced by details of the crime committed. 
Boccaccini et al., supra note 169, at 9.  
177. State v. Were, 890 N.E.2d 263, 294 (Ohio 2008); see also Pruitt v. State, 
834 N.E.2d 90, 112-13 (Ind. 2005). 
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V. Recommended National Standard: A Model for 
Establishing Intellectual Disability 
The following proposed standard for defining intellectual disability 
and establishing a standard of proof should be adopted by all states 
enforcing capital punishment. These states should pass legislation 
protecting intellectually disabled individuals from execution in 
accordance with the Atkins decision and the Eighth Amendment.178 
Within these statutes, states should also incorporate the following 
definition of intellectual disability and the standard for proving such 
disability. 
A.  Definition of Intellectual Disability and Elimination of Age-Eighteen 
Onset Requirement 
Although the anticipated DSM-V proposes a new definition for 
intellectual disability, it has not yet been finalized or adopted by the 
APA.179 The DSM-V’s required onset of intellectual disability symptoms 
“during the developmental period”180 is too broad and ambiguous for 
courts to apply, especially because the APA currently gives no guidance 
on what constitutes the “developmental period.” As evidence of the 
vagueness of this language, the Social Security Administration (SSA) is 
attempting to narrow its definition of intellectual disability used for 
determining disability benefits.181 The SSA currently requires an 
individual’s intellectual disability to manifest during the developmental 
period, similar to the proposed definition in the DSM-V.182 However, the 
SSA wants to “simplify this language by removing [the] reference to the 
‘developmental period’ and referring only to the period before age 22.”183 
The SSA’s move to eliminate the ambiguous “developmental period” 
 
178. James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to 
State Legislative Issues 4, Death Penalty Information  
Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/MREllisLeg.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
179. See supra Part I.B. 
180. Intellectual Developmental Disorder Proposed Revision, APA, 
http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013).  
181. See Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Mental Disorders, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 51,336, 51,336 (proposed Aug. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. 
pts. 404, 416).  
182. 20 C.F.R. § 404 subpart P app. 1 12.05 (2012); see also DSM-IV-TR, supra 
note 43. 
183. Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Mental Disorders, 75 Fed. Reg. 
51,336, 51,340 (proposed Aug. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 
404, 416). By changing its age-of-onset requirement to twenty-two, the 
SSA is replicating the requirements of states like Maryland and Indiana. 
See supra Part II.C. 
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013  
Defining Intellectual Disability and Establishing a Standard of Proof 
345 
language from its intellectual disability criteria proves that the 
anticipated DSM-V may not be well-received in the legal community. 
Thus, the model definition of intellectual disability should not 
incorporate the “developmental period” language from the DSM-V.  
Instead, states should use a combination of the AAIDD and the 
APA’s DSM-IV-TR definitions when defining intellectual disability. 
With the exception of the anticipated DSM-V, the definitions of 
intellectual disability promulgated by the two leading mental health 
organizations have not conceptually changed in the past five decades.184 
Therefore, the standard definition for intellectual disability that states 
should adopt is as follows:  
Intellectual disability is defined as a mental impairment 
characterized by (1) significant limitations in intellectual 
functioning and (2) significant impairments in adaptive behavior 
as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills.  
(3) This disability originates prior to the age of twenty-two.  
Three assumptions are essential to the application of this 
definition: (1) limitations in present functioning must be 
considered within the context of community environments typical 
of the individual’s age, peers, and culture; (2) valid assessment 
considers cultural and linguistic diversity as well as differences in 
communication, sensory, motor, and behavioral factors; and  
(3) within an individual, limitations often coexist with strengths.185  
The first two elements of this definition are largely untouched. The 
critical revision is the third element which extends the age-of-onset 
requirement from eighteen to twenty-two. This standard is modeled after 
states like Maryland and Indiana that already incorporate an age of 
onset of twenty-two.186 By extending the age of onset, this new standard 
provides defendants with four additional years from which to produce 
evidence of limitations in adaptive behavior and intellectual functioning 
for the court. Although extending the age requirement does not fix the 
problem that there may still be defendants who have not taken an IQ 
test prior to age twenty-two, it is impossible not to establish an age 
cutoff when defining intellectual disability. Without an age cutoff, any 
standard would be too vague and ambiguous for courts to apply.187 Thus, 
 
184. See Gresham & Reschly, supra note 142, at 132.  
185. Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability and the AAIDD 
Definition, AAIDD, http://www.aaidd.org/content_185.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2013).  
186. See supra Part II.C. 
187. See supra Part I.B for a discussion on establishing a standard using the 
“developmental period” as the age-of-onset requirement. 
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the best alternative is to increase the age-of-onset requirement to age 
twenty-two. 
B. Rejecting a Fixed IQ Cutoff Score 
States should follow the guidelines established by the AAIDD and 
the APA and take into account both the Flynn Effect188 and the 
standard error of measurement.189 States should ensure that IQ tests 
administered to individuals claiming intellectual disability are re-
calibrated every year to ensure that there is no IQ inflation. 
Additionally, states should account for the standard error of 
measurement and the “band of error concept” by not relying heavily on 
an individual’s IQ scores, but instead focusing on other evidence showing 
limited intellectual functioning. In doing so, states should follow in 
California’s footsteps and not require a fixed IQ cutoff score at all.190 The 
recommended statutory language for incorporating this more relaxed 
standard is:  
The court, in determining an individual’s IQ score, “shall take into 
account the margin of error for the test administered.”191 The 
court shall subtract five points from the defendant’s IQ score. If 
the defendant has taken multiple IQ tests, the court shall only use 
the defendant’s lowest IQ score for determining limited intellectual 
functioning.  
If the defendant has not previously taken an IQ test, the court 
shall ensure that the defendant is administered an IQ test that has 
been calibrated within one or two calendar years prior to 
administration. If the defendant has previously taken an IQ test 
and the defendant’s IQ score was above 70 (after subtracting five 
points from the defendant’s IQ score), the court shall not preclude 
the defendant from claiming an intellectual disability or 
introducing evidence of the defendant’s intellectual disability at 
trial. The defendant may not automatically be deemed not 
intellectually disabled, and the court shall consider additional 
evidence in determining limited intellectual functioning. Additional 
evidence includes, but is not limited to, consideration of the 
defendant’s school or military records, work history, and life 
functioning.  
The court shall recognize that any defendant with an IQ score of 
70 or below (after subtracting five points from the defendant’s IQ 
 
188. See supra Part IV.B.1 for a discussion on the Flynn Effect. 
189. See supra Part IV.B.1 for discussion on the standard error of measurement. 
190. See supra Part II.A.1; see also In re Hawthorne, 105 P.3d 552, 557 (Cal. 
2005). 
191. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-753(K)(5) (LexisNexis 2012). 
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score) automatically satisfies the required showing of limited 
intellectual functioning.  
By disallowing courts to automatically deem an individual not 
intellectually disabled merely because he has an IQ score of 76 or above, 
the proposed statutory language effectively eliminates a fixed IQ cutoff 
score.192 Instead, the proposed statute requires courts to consider the 
defendant’s additional evidence when determining whether the defendant 
has limited intellectual functioning. The statute also factors in the Flynn 
Effect and the standard error of measurement.  
C. Guidelines for Adaptive Behavior Evidence 
In addition to information regarding the individual’s past, 
limitations in adaptive behavior should be determined by objective tests 
to avoid subjective interpretations of evidence. The AAIDD is set to 
release a new adaptive behavior test known as the Diagnostic Adaptive 
Behavior Scale (DABS) in 2013.193 Currently, only two tests exist to 
diagnose limitations in adaptive behavior and functioning194: the 
Woodcock-Johnson Scales of Independent Behavior and the Vineland 
Adaptive Behavior Scale. The Woodcock-Johnson Scales of Independent 
Behavior is primarily used to measure adaptive functioning and social 
skills in children, whereas the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale is used 
to “test the social skills of individuals from birth to nineteen years of 
age.”195 The AAIDD’s new test, DABS, is designed for people between 
the ages of four and twenty-one.196 Although the test may not cover 
those defendants that are older than twenty-one, it provides a useful tool 
for practitioners to consider while trying to prove limitations in adaptive 
behavior. Additionally, DABS can potentially be used as a framework 
for adaptive behavior tests for older individuals with limitations in 
adaptive behavior.  
 
192. The recommendation to abolish a fixed IQ cutoff score is supported by the 
American Bar Association. See American Bar Association, ABA Death 
Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project: Jurisdictional Assessments 
Chapters and Recommendations – January 2010, 16 (2010), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_ 
build/death_penalty_moratorium/protocols2010.authcheckdam.pdf. 
193. Diagnostic Adaptive Behavior Scale, AAIDD, http://www.aaidd.org/ 
content_106.cfm?navID=23 (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).  
194. Tammy Reynolds et al., Intellectual Disabilities: Tests of Adaptive 
Behavioral Skills, Community Counseling Services, Inc. 
http://www.communitycounselingservices.org/poc/view_doc.php?type=d
oc&id=10347&cn=208 (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
195. Id.  
196. FAQ on AAIDD’s New Diagnostic Adaptive Behavior Scale, AAIDD, 
http://www.aaidd.org/content_107.cfm?navID=24 (last visited Feb. 15, 
2013). 
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One of the purposes of DABS is to establish a “diagnosis of 
intellectual disability . . . to determine eligibility for . . . specific 
treatment within the criminal justice system.”197 With this core purpose, 
the AAIDD ensured that DABS would take into account “other 
considerations” in testing for limitations in adaptive behavior. In 
addition to the activities of daily living, “other considerations” in 
adaptive functioning include “activities an individual actually performs, 
rather than the ability to perform activities—what a person does, rather 
than can do. Adaptive behavior is recognized as being dependent on the 
expectations of age, culture group, and the demands of particular 
situations and environments.”198 Also, a DABS test administrator can 
individually tailor the test to each person, because the test assesses 
processes from “a pool of over 500 items . . . [that] relate directly to the 
[test taker’s] concepts of gullibility, vulnerability, and social 
cognition.”199 Because the “tailored testing” enables administrators of the 
test to give various test items to different people “but still place people 
on the same scale,”200 the AAIDD’s new adaptive behavior test may 
provide a suitable and beneficial guideline and standard for assessing 
limitations in adaptive functioning in individuals facing the death 
penalty.201 States should require that a standardized adaptive behavior 
test be administered to individuals claiming an intellectual disability, 
and the particular standardized test should be established by either the 
AAIDD or the APA. Once DABS is released in 2013, states should 
require experts to use DABS when testing adaptive behaviors of capital 
defendants that are under age twenty-one. In this way, states can limit 
and control for the subjective nature of determining limited adaptive 
behaviors.  
D. Judge and Jury Decision 
Individuals facing death should have as many opportunities to be 
evaluated by fact finders as possible. States should follow New Jersey’s 
precedent and allow individuals four opportunities to present evidence 
regarding a claim of intellectual disability. All individuals claiming 
intellectual disability should be able to present facts and evidence: “[1] 
 
197. Id.  
198. Id. 
199. Id.  
200. Id. 
201. The AAIDD cautions that “[i]n evaluating the role that an adaptive 
behavior score—as assessed on a standardized measure—plays in making a 
diagnosis of [intellectual disability], clinicians should a) determine the 
standard error of measurement . . . for the particular assessment 
instrument used, . . . and b) assure that within reporting, standard error of 
measurement is properly addressed.” AAIDD Manual, supra note 29, at 
47.  
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at pretrial before the trial court, [2] before a jury during the guilt phase 
trial, [3] at a separate hearing before a jury after the guilt phase trial; 
and, finally, [4] before a jury at the penalty-phase trial as mitigation.”202 
Although some courts have held that claims of intellectual disability do 
not require a jury trial,203 when the stakes are life or death, individuals 
should have as many chances as possible to present evidence to judges 
and juries to avoid execution.  
Some may argue that providing defendants with four opportunities 
to present evidence of an intellectual disability is not cost efficient for 
states. However, this argument fails to consider that “over two-thirds of 
all capital convictions and sentences are reversed because of serious error 
during trial or sentencing.”204 This means that many people who are 
convicted and sentenced to death are innocent or have an intellectual 
disability. The efficiency argument cannot override such a substantial 
margin of error, especially when an individual’s life is on the line. By 
depriving defendants of multiple opportunities to present evidence of 
their intellectual disability, states risk violating the Constitution by 
executing an intellectually disabled person. Although providing 
defendants with four opportunities to present evidence may not be the 
most efficient method, states should be more concerned with accuracy 
than efficiency when making life or death decisions. Arguably, capital 
punishment is a “waste of taxpayers’ money and has no public safety 
benefit.”205 Thus, if states insist on enforcing the death penalty, then 
they should ensure that the correct people are being executed and not 
the intellectually disabled. 
E. Standard for Testifying Experts 
All states should require testifying experts to be specialized in the 
field of intellectual disabilities. Some psychiatrists are experienced at 
assessing intellectually disabled individuals; however, many are not. 
Defendants facing death row deserve an experienced and trained expert 
who specializes in intellectual disabilities to testify for them.206 States 
 
202. State v. Jimenez, 908 A.2d 181, 192 (N.J. 2006). 
203. State v. Were, 890 N.E.2d 263, 294 (Ohio 2008); see also Pruitt v. State, 
834 N.E.2d 90, 112-13 (Ind. 2005). 
204. American Civil Liberties Union Capital Punishment Project, Reason #1 to 
Support a National Moratorium on Executions, Prison Policy 
Initiative, http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/aclu_dp_factsheet1.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013).  
205. The Case Against the Death Penalty, American Civil Liberties Union 
(Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/case-against-
death-penalty. 
206. Ellis, supra note 178, at 11. The AAIDD also advocates for experts to have 
specialized training in the area of intellectual disability. AAIDD Manual, 
supra note 29, at 40.  
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should ensure that the expert appointed by the court or the prosecutor is 
familiar with the “best practices” standard in the field of intellectual 
disability.207 The AAIDD states that  
best practices involve understanding a) the definition of 
intellectual disability; . . . b) the role of assessment in diagnosis, 
classification, and developing systems of supports; . . .  
c) intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior and their 
assessment; . . . d) the role of etiological factors in the diagnosis of 
[intellectual disability]; and . . . e) a multidimensional approach to 
classification.208 
All states should ensure that testifying experts are truly experts in the 
field of intellectual disability and have specialized experience working 
with individuals with intellectual disabilities. In this way, states avoid 
situations in which experts in different fields come to contrary 
conclusions concerning an individual’s intellectual disability.  
F. Standard for Burden of Proof 
States should set the burden of proof at a preponderance of the 
evidence standard. Because of the highly subjective nature of 
determining intellectual disabilities—“an inquiry that is often rife with 
doubt—it becomes . . . [clear] that [a high burden of proof] standard 
unquestionably will result in the execution of those offenders that Atkins 
protects.”209 Additionally, the Supreme Court has warned states against 
the use of a high burden of proof “when a factual determination involves 
medical or psychiatric diagnoses.”210 The Atkins Court stated that one of 
its justifications for holding that executing intellectually disabled persons 
is unconstitutional is the fact that intellectually disabled individuals 
have a 
lesser ability . . . to make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the 
face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating  
factors . . . [they] are less able to give meaningful assistance to 
 
207. See AAIDD Manual, supra note 29, at 88.  
208. Id. at 88-89. 
209. Hill v. Schofield, 608 F.3d 1272, 1281 (11th Cir. 2010), vacated, 625 F.3d 
1335 (11th Cir.), and aff’d en banc sub nom, Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 
1335 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2727 (2012), reh’g denied, 
2012 WL 3761964 (Aug. 31, 2012). 
210. Id. at 1282; see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429-30 (1979) (holding 
that “there is a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely 
to be dangerous.”). The Supreme Court has also held that “it violated due 
process for a State to assign the burden of persuasion to the defendant on 
the issue of competence to stand trial at a level of ‘clear and convincing 
evidence.’” Ellis, supra note 178, at 15.  
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their counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor 
may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their 
crimes.211 
It is clear that the goal of the Atkins Court was to protect the 
intellectually disabled, and states can best do so by requiring defendants 
to prove intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence and 
not a higher standard. 
 
Conclusion 
In the ten years after Atkins permitted states to develop ways of 
enforcing its holding, national variations in the law have arisen that are 
detrimental to the protection of intellectually disabled individuals. Some 
states have adopted standards that entirely fail to protect intellectually 
disabled individuals from being sentenced to death. Because of Atkins’ 
goal of protecting all intellectually disabled people from capital 
punishment, laws regarding the determination of an individual’s 
intellectual disability should be made with the goal of preventing 
inaccurate assessments of a defendant’s intellectual disabilities.  
My recommended model standard for defining intellectual disability 
and its standard of proof contemplates the inherent subjective nature of 
determining whether an individual has intellectual disabilities and 
attempts to merge science and law in an evenhanded and reasonable 
way. Although states are not required to adopt a new standard, all 
states should at least consider the benefits of a more flexible test that 
adequately protects all intellectually disabled individuals from being 
executed in accordance with Atkins and the US Constitution. 
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